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Abstract 
 
Increasingly, U.S. firms are hiring their new CEOs from outside the firms. This study 
investigates the differences in compensation between outsider CEOs and insider CEOs from 
three dimensions: pay level, pay and performance link, and pay mix. Our analyses show: (1) 
outsider CEOs are paid more than insider CEOs, (2) pay and performance link is very weak for 
outsider CEOs, and (3) compensation package for outsider CEOs emphasizes the use of stock 
options. While several factors (e.g., firm size, firm performance, CEO tenure, ownership 
structure) influence insider CEOs' pay, firm size is the only determinant of outsider CEOs' pay. 
Our results suggest we will be able to understand CEO compensation more accurately if we 
analyze CEOs from different origins (insiders, outsiders, founders) separately. 
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Origin of CEO and Compensation Strategy: 
Differences between Insiders and Outsiders 
 
Compensation for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has long been at the center of public 
attention. Major business publications (e.g., Business Week, Forbes) and research institutions 
(e.g., Conference Board) compile special reports of CEO compensation every year. The AFL-
CIO created a web site critical of CEO compensation practices. It offers interactive comparisons 
of the difference between the compensation of specific companies' CEOs and their employees. 
Business publications claim that the link between company performance and CEO 
compensation does not justify CEO pay. For example, Business Week (1997a) states that CEO 
pay is “out of control,” following that “many companies make exorbitant payouts for so-so 
performances, dilute real shareholder return, and glorify CEOs at the expense of other 
employees.” Despite the recent slowdown in U.S. economy, executive pay "continues to 
explode" (Business Week, 2001), and thus the public has the impression that executive pay is 
unfair and unjustifiable. Colvin (2001) was even more cynical stating "executive compensation 
has become highway robbery - we all know that. But how did it happen?" 
CEO compensation in the United States has also long been the subject of research 
(Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Earlier studies typically devoted their efforts to finding the 
determinants of CEO pay. These studies show organization size is one of the major influences 
on the level of CEO compensation (Agarwal, 1981; Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Roberts, 
1957).  Researchers have made the greatest effort in studying the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO pay level. Empirical studies generally found a weak, positive relationship 
between the level of CEO cash compensation and organizational performance (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1985). More recent studies turned their attentions to governance or 
contingency factors (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Concerning governance factors, studies 
report ownership structures (e.g., David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Werner & Tosi, 1995) and 
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compositions of board of directors (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1995) are influential to the level of 
CEO compensation. Other researchers show certain contingency factors such as the firm's 
degree of diversification (Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990) and internationalization (Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998) are positively related to the level of CEO compensation. 
Paralleling the interest in how much CEOs are paid, the questions about who gets 
selected as new CEOs attract public attention. Numerous stories were reported in business 
press concerning the recent CEO succession at General Electric. The former CEO, Jack Welch 
selected a few candidates for his successor, and had them compete for the nomination for the 
next CEO. Upon making the decision to choose Jeffrey Immelt as his successor, Jack Welch 
urged other candidates to depart the firm. However, the departed candidates were not merely 
losers; they were subsequently invited to Home Depot and 3M as new CEOs. 
Among the issues in CEO succession, the origin of new CEOs (whether they are 
promoted from within, or hired from outside) is one of the most frequently reported topics. 
Business magazines repetitively discuss the possibility of a firm’s hiring outsider CEOs when 
the retirement of incumbent CEOs is expected. For example, Fortune (1999a) reported the 
possibility of Hewlett-Packard's choosing a new CEO from outside the company when the 
retirement of incumbent CEO was imminent. Even for the CEO succession at General Electric, 
an article referred to the potential choice of selecting an outsider CEO (Fortune, 1999b). While 
U.S. firms have traditionally promoted their new CEOs from within (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996; Vancil, 1987), the recent trend is that firms are more likely to hire executives from the 
outside (Business Week, 1997b).  
Similar to compensation, questions about the origin of CEOs have long attracted 
researchers (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Some studies investigated what causes firms to hire 
outsider CEOs rather than promoting insiders (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1977), and other studies examined the difference in subsequent organizational 
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performance between firms that hired new CEOs from outside and those which promoted new 
CEOs from within (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Zajac, 1990).  
In spite of researchers' long interest in both CEO compensation and origin of CEO, only 
limited research attempt has been made to understand if there is any relationship between 
these two topics. This is not to say research has neglected possible differences in 
compensation between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. Several studies did include the origin 
of CEO in the analysis of CEO compensation. A study observed insider school superintendent 
successors were paid less (Carlson, 1961). Deckop (1988) examined the difference in pay level 
among CEOs from different origins, and reported that outsider CEOs received significantly 
greater cash compensation than insider CEOs, and both insiders and outsiders received more 
than company founder CEOs. Similarly, Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987) included origin of 
CEO variable in estimating CEO pay level, but failed to find significant difference in total pay 
between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. They also estimated the ratio of bonus to total pay 
and that of long-term incentives to total pay, and reported the ratio of bonus to total pay was 
higher for outsider CEOs than insider CEOs in management-controlled firms. In the analysis of 
the pay gap between CEOs and other executives, Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) included 
the origin of CEO in their estimation models, and reported pay gap was significantly bigger in 
firms whose CEOs were outsiders. 
Although these research findings were informative, theoretical importance for including 
CEO origin variables in CEO compensation research has yet to be developed. Past studies 
generally included origin of CEO as one of several control variables except for Deckop (1988) 
and Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987), which treated origin of CEO as a possible major factor influential 
to CEO compensation. We believe the recent trend of increasing outsider CEOs increased the 
importance to investigate if there is any systematic difference in compensation between insider 
CEOs and outsider CEOs. Is Robert Nardelli, Home Depot's newly appointed CEO, paid 
differently from other new CEOs appointed in the same period? Does his pay differ from what it 
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would be if Home Depot had chosen its new CEO from within the firm? The primary purpose of 
this study is to answer these questions. Using the compensation data for CEOs in Fortune 500 
companies, we examine how the origin of CEO is associated with CEO compensation.  
The principal contributions of this study are threefold. First, we extend related theoretical  
works, particularly agency theory and managerialism to include origin of CEO in CEO 
compensation research. Second, we examine the differences in CEO compensation systems 
from three dimensions: (1) pay level,  (2) pay and performance link, and (3) pay mix. While the 
difference in pay level between insiders CEOs and outsider CEOs were already recognized by 
the past research (e.g., Deckop, 1988; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987), the other two dimensions 
have been underdeveloped. We pay closer attention to pay mix variables. Our analysis shows 
the relationships between origin of CEO and CEO pay mix is influenced by measures used. 
Finally, our data are the most recent information on CEO compensation. Given the recent trend 
of increasing outsider CEOs, the analysis using latest data may offer new insights for the 
relationship between CEO succession and CEO compensation. In addition, considering the 
recent dramatic increase in CEO compensation, it is meaningful to see whether the 
conventional determinants based on the past research (e.g., size, performance, tenure, 
ownership) really "determine" recent CEO compensation. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Research on CEO compensation has traditionally focused on its pay level. Even now, 
virtually all empirical studies that examine CEO pay begin by discussing pay level. One good 
example is the April 1998 issue of the Academy of Management Journal, which featured 
managerial compensation and contained six empirical studies. While each studies analyzed 
CEO compensation from different angles, all six studies examined the level of CEO 
compensation. Three articles (Daily, Johnson, Ellstramd, & Dalton, 1998; Ezzamel & Watson, 
1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998) basically focused only on pay level. Two articles (David et al., 
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1998; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) examined pay mix in addition to pay level. One (Conyon & 
Peck, 1998) examined pay and performance link as well as pay level. This example illustrates 
the dominance of pay level as the most important dimension of CEO compensation. 
 In investigating the determinants of the level of CEO pay, researchers have been 
frustrated with the weak relationship between firm performance and CEO pay. Based on 
normative agency model (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), researchers expected stockholders should 
align CEO pay with firm performance to elicit the CEOs' efforts to increase firm performance. 
Nevertheless, past research often reported only weak or even insignificant relationship between 
CEO pay and firm performance (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
reported that CEOs received only $3.25 for every $1,000 increase in shareholders' wealth. By 
the late 1990s', when equity-based compensation (i.e., stock options, stock grants) became an 
important part of CEO compensation package, researchers re-examined the link between firm 
performance and CEO pay which included the value of equity-based compensation. For 
example, Hall and Liebman (1998) reported 10 percent increase in firm value was associated 
with the increase in CEOs' wealth by about 1.25 million dollars if the change in the value of the 
firms' stock owned by the CEOs were taken into account. However, as far as CEO pay (not 
CEO wealth) is concerned, pay and performance link is still weak even if equity based 
compensation is included. Recently, Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) reviewed 
past empirical research, and conducted meta-analysis on CEO pay and firm performance link. 
Their analysis showed less than 5 percent of the variance of CEO pay was explained by firm 
performance. Based on this weak pay and performance link, Tosi et al. (2000) suggested that 
moderator variables (e.g., ownership structure, industry) might play an important role. Because 
they could not statistically verify what variables really moderate CEO pay and performance link, 
further development of research on CEO pay and performance link is left for future researchers. 
 Increasingly, recent studies recognize employee compensation packages include many 
forms such as base pay, bonus, stock options, and benefits (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998), which 
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induces researchers to investigate how organizations mix different pay forms. Generally these 
studies relied upon agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen& Meckling, 1976), and focused on 
the relative importance of incentives in executive compensation package. Their specifics varied 
across studies, and the findings are complicated. Studies have reported relative importance of 
incentives depends on various factors such as ownership structures (David, Kochlar, & Levits, 
1998; Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987; Werner & Tosi, 1995), risk (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Bloom & Milkovich, 
1998), prior firm performance (Abowd, 1990) as well as firm size and performance (e.g., Gerhart 
& Milkovich, 1990; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987). Past research shows firms have more discretion 
regarding how they pay than regarding how much they pay (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), and 
thus pay mix issue is another critical dimension of CEO compensation. 
 
Difference in Pay Level between Insiders and Outsiders 
As we mentioned earlier, a few empirical studies have already examined the relationship 
between origin of CEO and compensation. Deckop (1988) showed outsider CEOs were paid 
more in terms of cash compensation. He explained CEOs promoted from within companies ask 
for less compared with those hired from the outside because insiders evaluate the status 
attached to the promotion. In a study comparing the compensation between incumbent CEOs 
and their predecessors, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) reported outsider CEOs were paid 
more than their predecessors, whereas there was not a significant difference between insider 
CEOs and their predecessors. They explained outsiders face a substantial risk of failure and 
encounter personal and family cost in a move, and thus companies have to compensate for this 
risk and cost. 
Taken these past studies together, we argue compensating wage differential theory 
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 2000) offers solid explanations for the difference in pay level between 
insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. Outsider CEOs will face greater uncertainty because they 
have less information about the new firms as compared with insider CEOs who have been in 
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their firms for years. If outsider CEOs perceive greater performance uncertainty than insider 
CEOs, firms have to pay greater premiums for outsider CEOs. 
Moreover, in making decisions whether to accept the offer, outsiders will pay greater 
attention to market pay level to evaluate their compensation package. To encourage such 
outsiders to accept the offer, firms will have to offer pay level that is competitive in executive 
labor market. In contrast, insiders are more likely to be interested in their success in the 
promotion tournament, and they are less likely to compare their pay with external market. This 
difference in market orientation will lead new outsider CEOs to receive more than new insider 
CEOs. Finally, companies have to provide premiums to compensate for difficulties inherent in 
changing workplace. Thus, 
H1: The pay level for outsider CEOs is higher than insider CEOs. 
 
Origin of CEOs and Pay and Performance Link 
Agency theory  (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) argues CEO pay should be 
linked with the interest of shareholders. This theory addresses how the most optimal contract is 
achieved in situations that principals delegate work to agents in exchange for rewards. Agency 
theory focuses on two problems associated with this agency relationship: (a) goal conflicts 
between the principals and agents, and (b) difference in their attitudes toward risks. Essentially, 
the theory states two alternatives (either behavior-based contract or outcome-based contract) 
are available for principals, and the principals choose the type of contract taking the cost 
associated with the two alternatives into account. When principals can observe behaviors of the 
agents at low cost, they choose behavior-based contract. In this case, the reward is paid as 
salary rather than incentives. In contrast, when principals cannot monitor the agents at low cost, 
they choose outcome-based contract, and rewards are paid as incentives linked to the 
achievement of desired outcomes. Since the rewards vary with performance, incentive 
alignment transfers performance risk from principals to agents. The agents, who are assumed to 
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be risk-averse accept such a contract only when adequate risk premiums are offered. In short, 
the principals choose the type of contract by comparing the monitoring cost with risk premiums 
involved with incentive alignment. Because top executive's job is less programmable, and it is 
difficult to specify desired behaviors (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), the cost for monitoring CEOs' 
job incurs greater cost, and consequently the principals (stockholders) are more likely to use 
incentives. As a result, stockholders align the incentives to CEOs with their interest, specifically 
with firm performance. 
While agency theory suggests CEO pay should be aligned with firm performance, 
managerialism offers a contrasting view on CEO compensation. It argues if managers' 
discretion is not constrained, they try to design their pay linked with firm size rather than firm 
performance (Tosi & Werner, 1995). Tosi et al. (2000) offered three reasons for this tendency. 
First, because firm size is more controllable than firm performance, CEOs prefer stronger link 
between firm size and their pay. Second, CEOs actually have little difficulty in justifying strong 
link between firm size and CEO pay by rationalizing large firm size is associated with (a) 
increased complexity, (b) increased CEO human capital necessary to run the organization, and 
(c) increased hierarchical levels. Finally, since CEOs are risk averse, they try to avoid pay 
systems linked with firm performance, which involve certain performance uncertainty. Because 
managerialism argues greater managerial discretion enables CEOs to influence their pay 
systems to be aligned with firm size rather than firm performance, the extent to which CEO pay 
is associated with firm performance depends on the degree of the CEOs' managerial discretion. 
In a comprehensive discussion on managerialism, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) 
proposed that managerial discretion is influenced by several factors such as task environment 
(e.g., product differentiability, market growth), internal organization factors (e.g., resource 
availability, internal political conditions), and managerial characteristics (e.g., aspiration level, 
commitment). Among these factors, empirical studies have typically examined ownership 
structure as a major internal organization factor that influences managerial discretion (Tosi, 
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Gomez-Mejia, Loughry, Werner, Banning, Kats, Harris, & Silva, 1999). Such studies generally 
categorized firms into (a) owner-controlled firms, (b) management-controlled firms, and (c) 
owner-managed firms according to the firms' stock ownership (Werner & Tosi, 1995). These 
studies reported CEO pay and performance link is stronger in owner-controlled firms because 
the existence of influential non-managerial stockholders reduces the latitudes of actions for the 
CEOs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Werner & Tosi, 1995). 
When insider CEOs and outsider CEOs are compared, we claim that outsider CEOs have 
more discretion than insider CEOs. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1996) described the issue of 
insiders versus outsiders in CEO succession is a variation of the issue of continuity versus 
change. According to them, one main reason for choosing outsider CEOs is that the firms need 
some changes. CEO selection committee expects outsiders can change their way of doing 
business more easily than insiders, who often took part in the previous decision makings while 
they were managers. Thus, new outsider CEOs are generally entitled to have stronger 
discretion to change existing business strategies or corporate cultures. In contrast, the 
discretion of insider CEOs is often constrained by existing business strategies and corporate 
cultures developed by their predecessors. For instance, Jeffrey Immelt, chosen by Jack Welch 
as his successor may be less willing to change what Jack Welch has done before. Thus, we 
argue outsider CEOs have more discretion than insider CEOs, and consequently pay for 
performance link is weaker for outsider CEOs. 
H2: Pay for performance link is weaker for outsider CEOs than insider CEOs. 
 
Difference in Pay Mix between Insiders and Outsiders 
Agency theory is a dominant theory in pay mix research. As we already discussed, the 
theory states principals will choose the form of compensation (either salary or incentives) by 
comparing monitoring cost with risk premiums involved with incentives alignment (Eisenhardt, 
1988). If principals can monitor the behavior of the agents at low cost, they choose salary. In 
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contrast, when principals cannot monitor the agents at low cost, they choose incentives. In short, 
the choice of an appropriate pay forms depends on the monitoring cost of the agents' behaviors. 
While the degree of monitoring difficulty generally depends on the nature of the job 
(Eisenhardt, 1988) or job responsibility (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), it is also affected by the 
amount of information that the principals hold on the agents' abilities. As principals accumulate 
the information on the abilities of the agents, the predictability of the agents' behavior increases, 
and the monitoring cost decreases consequently (Murphy, 1986). In this case, principals are 
more likely to choose salary rather than incentives. When available information is compared 
between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs, the principals have more information about the 
abilities of insider CEOs, who have been in companies before promotion. Accordingly, cost of 
monitoring outsider CEOs’ will be more expensive than that of monitoring insider CEOs. The 
difference in monitoring cost suggests principals are more likely to use outcome-based 
compensation for outsider CEOs than insider CEOs. Based on agency theory argument, we 
claim pay mix for outsider CEOs will be characterized by stronger emphasis on incentive forms 
as compared with pay mix for insider CEOs. 
In contrast, managerialism suggests pay mix for outsider CEOs will indicate less emphasis 
on incentives than insider CEOs. Because CEOs are risk-averse, they try to avoid variable pay, 
which transfers risk from stockholders to CEOs. Therefore, CEOs with greater discretion will try 
to influence their pay packages to have less emphasis on incentives. As we already discussed, 
we argue outsider CEOs have more discretion than insider CEOs. Based on managerialism 
discussion, pay mix for outsider CEOs will be characterized by weaker emphasis on incentives. 
As a result, we have two competing hypotheses concerning the difference in pay mix between 
insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. 
H3a: Agency theory prediction is that pay mix for outsider CEOs will 
indicate stronger emphasis on incentives as compared with the pay mix for 
insider CEOs. 
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H3b: Managerialism prediction is that pay mix for outsider CEOs will indicate weaker 
emphasis on incentives compared with the pay mix for insider CEOs. 
 
It is possible that two different forces cancel out each other, which will result in 
insignificant difference in pay mix between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. However, CEO 
compensation package consists of several forms of incentives (e.g., bonus, stock options, 
restricted stock grant), and thus some incentives may be more emphasized in outsider CEOs' 
compensation (consistent with agency theory prediction), and other incentives may be less 
emphasized in it (consistent with managerialism prediction). 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we collected data on compensation for CEOs in Fortune 500 
companies (2000). Compensation data on CEOs came from COMPUSTAT's Execucomp 
service, which complies compensation data from firm proxy statement. Firm accounting and 
financial data were obtained from COMPUSTAT data file. We excluded the CEOs who were 
appointed during the fiscal year 2000 from our sample because their compensation may not be 
an annual base. Moreover, compensation data for outsider CEOs, who were appointed during 
the fiscal year 2000 may include assigning bonus. Because we are interested in the systematic 
difference in compensation between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs, excluding these data is 
consistent with the purpose of our research. Our collection effort yielded 321 firms with usable 
data for the analysis. 
 
Origin of CEO and Compensation Strategy: CAHRS WP 02-03 
 
 
Page 15 
Measures 
Dependent variables.  COMPUSTAT's Execucomp offers the information on the amount of 
different pay forms paid to CEOs (base pay, bonus, stock options, restricted stock grant, long-
term incentive plans, and others). For the pay level measure, we used the total of all forms of 
compensation paid to CEOs. The value of equity-based compensation was calculated by Black-
Scholes model. To reduce heteroskedasticity in our regression models, we applied a logarithmic 
transformation. 
 Measurement used to test the difference in pay mix needs greater attention since past 
research examining pay mix has employed different measures. A common method of examining 
pay mix is to measure the ratio of bonus to base pay (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Werner & 
Tosi, 1995). Others use the ratio of bonus to total pay (e.g., Anderson, Banker, & Ravindran, 
2000; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987) and the ratio of long-term incentives to total pay (e.g., 
Westphal 1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; 1997). Some looked at the relative importance of 
individual incentive forms (e.g., bonus, stock options), but others examined the relative 
importance of total incentives. Although almost all of these empirical studies used agency theory 
for their theoretical framework, the employed measures disagreed. In general, past studies did 
not discuss the validity of employed pay mix measures extensively, and some studies did not 
even provide the discussion on this issue. Indeed, agency theory is virtually silent as to what 
should be used as the numerator (individual incentives or total incentives) and denominator (i.e., 
base pay or total pay) in developing pay mix measures, and thus it is not clear how these 
different measures describe CEO pay mix in a different way. Given the circumstances, we 
decided to use multiple measures and compare the results using different measures. 
Considering the measures used in the past studies, we developed six CEO pay mix measures: 
(1) bonus/base pay, (2) bonus/total pay, (3) stock options/base pay, (4) stock options/total pay, 
(5) total incentives/base pay, and (6) total incentives/total pay. Total incentives are the sum of 
bonus, restricted stock grant, stock options, and long-term incentives. Examining relative 
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importance of bonus and that of stock options separately is meaningful because we have two 
competing hypotheses concerning the difference in pay mix, and the results may differ 
depending on what pay mix measures we use. Although examining what measure is the most 
appropriate (e.g., for agency theory, for managerialism) is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
expect some variations in the results depending on pay mix measures used. Because their 
distributions were skewed, we applied a logarithmic transformation (David, et al, 1998; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1994). 
 
Independent variables.  The definition of outsider CEOs varies across studies (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Some studies define insider CEOs as those who are 
promoted from within the firms, and outsider CEOs as any others (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993). 
Others define outsiders as those whose tenure in the firms is less than five years before 
appointed as CEOs (Datta & Guthrie, 1994). Among these variable definitions, the most 
commonly used definition of outsiders in CEO succession research is Cannella and Lubatkin 
(1993). They define outsiders as those who have less than two years of tenure in the firm before 
being appointed as CEOs. We adopted their definition, and used two years as the cutoff point to 
distinguish outsider CEOs from insider CEOs. As well as outsider CEOs and insider CEOs, we 
developed another category of CEO origin: company founder CEOs because their pay system 
may be different from insiders and outsiders. Accordingly, we created two dummy variables 
corresponding to outsider CEOs and company founder CEOs. Insider CEOs are the reference 
group. 
 
Control variables.  We included several control variables. CEO compensation researchers 
agree organizational size is one of the major determinants of the level of CEO compensation. 
Past research also suggests organization size is associated with pay mix (Bloom & Milkovich, 
1998). We used the logarithm of the number of employees as a proxy for firm size. Similarly, 
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organization performance was included in our estimation model. Concerning the pay mix, the 
better performance is possibly associated with larger bonus, which may cause higher pay mix 
ratios whose numerators include bonus. As a proxy for organization performance, we used 
firms’ ROA. We lagged ROA by one year, and thus we used firms' ROA in 1999. As we 
discussed, past studies suggest ownership structure also influences both CEO pay level and 
pay mix. Following the approach used by Werner and Tosi (1995), we classified firms into three 
categories based on the distribution of stock ownership: (a) management-controlled firms, (b) 
owner-controlled firms, and (c) owner-managed firms. Owner-controlled firms were those in 
which at least one non-managerial stockholder possessed 5% or more of the firms' stock. The 
other firms were designated as management-controlled firms unless at least one of the 
executives owned 5% or more of the firms' stock, which were designated as owner-managed 
firms. Consequently, we created dummy variables that correspond to owner-controlled firms and 
owner-managed firms. Organization performance risk also needs to be controlled because 
research showed performance volatility was associated with the relative importance of bonus 
(Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). We used coefficient of variations of companies' ROA in the previous 
10 years. We included CEO tenure measured in years because it is associated with the strength 
of CEOs' political influence as well as their firm specific human capital. Past research reported it 
affected both the level of CEO pay (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1989) and pay mix (Hill & Phan, 
1991). We applied a logarithmic transformation because the distribution of tenure was skewed. 
Finally, to control for industry-related factors, we categorized industry based on the division 
structure in Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, which classifies U.S. firms into 8 
categories. Accordingly, we created 7 dummy variables corresponding this classification.  
 
Origin of CEO and Compensation Strategy: CAHRS WP 02-03 
 
 
Page 18 
Model Estimation 
To test our Hypotheses, we estimated this model:  
 
CEO Compensation = B0 + B1(number of employees) + B2(ROA) + B3(tenure as CEO) + 
B4(owner-controlled) + B5(owner-managed) + B6(risk) + 
B7(outsider CEO) + B8(founder CEO) + B9-15(industries).  
 
Our main interest is whether there is any differences in compensation between insider 
CEOs and outsider CEOs. Concerning the differences in pay level and pay mix, significance of 
the coefficient of outsider CEO (B7) shows there is a statistically significant difference in 
compensation between outsider CEOs and insider CEOs. With regard to pay and performance 
link, we estimate the pay levels of insider CEOs and outsider CEOs separately, and compare 
coefficients of performance (B2). 
 
RESULT 
Table 1 contains a summary of descriptive statistics for all our variables, along with their 
intercorrelations. It shows 20 % of the CEOs are hired from outside the firms. Insider CEOs are 
still majority in Fortune 500 firms; 73 % of the firms are insider CEOs. Firms managed by insider 
CEOs perform better than firms managed by insider CEOs (p = 0.02), whereas size does not 
differ between firms with insider CEOs and those with outsider CEOs. Table 2 reports the 
results for our tests of the difference in pay level (Hypothesis 1) and pay for performance link 
(Hypothesis 2) between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. The first column of the Table 2 
reports the result of ordinary least square model that estimates the level of CEO pay using all 
samples (N = 321). As we hypothesized, outsider CEOs were paid significantly greater than 
insider CEOs. Consistent with prior research, both firm size and firm performance were 
positively associated with the level of CEO pay. The result also shows CEOs in owner-
Origin of CEO and Compensation Strategy: CAHRS WP 02-03 
 
 
Page 19 
controlled firms were paid significantly less than management-controlled firms, which was also 
consistent with Werner and Tosi (1995). 
The second and third columns of the Table 2 report the results of two ordinary least 
square models that estimate the level of CEO pay using the firms with insiders CEOs (N = 235) 
and the firms with outsider CEOs (N = 63). As we hypothesized, pay and performance link was 
weaker for outsider CEOs than insider CEOs. While performance was not significantly related to 
the pay level of outsider CEOs, firm performance was positively associated with the pay level of 
insider CEOs. In addition, comparison of the coefficients of firm size suggests the effect of firm 
size was substantially greater for outsider CEOs (0.63) than insider CEOs (0.22). Instead, the 
control variables (e.g., CEO tenure, ownership) were all insignificant for the model estimating 
outsider CEOs' pay except for industry dummies. In fact, as far as outsider CEOs are concerned, 
the model using firm size and industry dummy variables fits better than the reported model 
(adjusted R-square = 0.361).  
We suspected it might be just because firms did not align the pay for new outsider CEOs' 
with firm performance for the first few years because new outsider CEOs are not accountable 
for the past firm performance. To test this idea, we estimated the outsider CEOs' pay level using 
only those whose tenure as CEO was five years or longer. If insignificant relationship between 
CEO pay and firm performance for outsider CEOs is attributed to newly hired CEOs, the model 
using outsider CEOs with longer tenure will exhibit a significant relationship between CEO pay 
and firm performance. However, the result does not differ from our original result reported in 
Table2; the relationship between outsider CEOs’ pay and firm performance was not statistically 
significant (N = 31, p < 0.27). In short, our analysis confirms out discussion that the 
compensation for outsider CEOs is weakly associated with firm performance. Thus, hypothesis 
2 was supported. 
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1.  CEO total pay* 15.75 1.06
2.  Bonus/base pay* 0.91 1.42 0.40
3.  Bonus/total pay* 0.16 0.12 -0.15 0.29
4.  Stock options/base pay* 1.55 1.70 0.63 0.79 -0.18
5.  Stock options/total pay* 0.34 0.20 0.46 0.06 -0.44 0.58
6.  Variable pay/base pay* 2.06 1.63 0.69 0.88 -0.04 0.95 0.38
7.  Variable pay/total pay* 0.55 0.14 0.63 0.27 0.09 0.47 0.59 0.53
8.  Number of employees* 10.32 1.19 0.22 0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
9.  ROA 5.31 5.41 0.12 0.06 -0.07 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.14
10. CEO tenure* 1.70 0.90 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.02
11. Owner-controlled firm 0.72 0.44 -0.19 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 -0.11 0.02 -0.13 -0.08
12. Owner-managed firm 0.02 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.00 0.19 0.05 -0.20
13. Risk 1.81 6.33 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 -0.03
14. Outsider CEO 0.20 0.40 0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.20
15. Founder CEO 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.14 -0.07 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.32 -0.02 0.16 0.03 -0.14
1.  N = 321. Correlations greater than 0.11 indicate p < 0.05.
2.  * indicates the variables are in logarithm.
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TABLE 2
Results of OLS Regression Analysis of CEO Compensation Level
Origin of CEOs
All Insider Outsider
Variable CEOs CEOs CEOs
Employee (logarithm) 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.63***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.13)
ROA 0.03** 0.05*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
CEO tenure (logarithm) 0.12+ 0.15* 0.13
(0.06) (0.07) (0.13)
Owner-controlled firm -0.29* -0.18 -0.35
(0.13) (0.13) (0.28)
Owner-managed firm -0.81+ -2.55** -0.29
(0.46) (0.94) (0.72)
Risk -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Outside CEO 0.32*
(0.14)
Founder CEO 0.34
(0.23)
Intercept 12.83*** 13.22*** 9.10***
(0.65) (0.64) (1.62)
N 321 235 63
Adjusted R-squre 0.198 0.240 0.353
F-statistics 5.95*** 6.27*** 3.82***
1. + < .10, * < .05, ** <  .01, *** <.001
2. Industry dummies were also added to the analyses.
3. Founder CEOs were also analyzed (N = 23). None of the variables was significant (F=0.63, p = 0.77).
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Table 3 reports the results for our test of the difference in pay mix between insider CEOs 
and outsider CEOs. Concerning the relative importance of bonus (first and second columns), 
there is no significant difference between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. With regard to the 
difference in the relative importance of stock options (third and fourth columns), the ratio of 
stock options to total pay is significantly greater for outsider CEOs while the ratio of stock 
options to base pay is not significantly different. The greater ratio of stock options to total pay for 
outsider CEOs supports our hypothesis based on agency theory (hypothesis 3a). Concerning 
the relative importance of variable pay (fifth and sixth columns), we could not obtain significant 
difference between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs though the difference in the ratio of 
variable pay to total pay was close to significance (p = 0.076). In summary, we could confirm 
significant difference only in the ratio of stock options to total pay using six different pay mix 
variables. 
In contrast, the difference between insider CEOs and founder CEOs were more robust; 
four of six models indicate significant difference. Results show ratio of bonus to base pay, ratio 
of stock options to both base pay and total pay, and ratio of variable pay to base pay for founder 
CEOs were significantly greater than those for insider CEOs. Concerning other control variables, 
firm performance was positively related to the relative importance of stock options (stock 
options/base pay, stock options/total pay) and that of variable pay (variable pay /base pay, 
variable pay/total pay). Risk was negatively related to the ratio of stock options to total pay and 
the ratio of variable pay to total pay. As a whole, none of the independent variables were 
consistently significant across six models that employed different pay mix measures, which 
supports our discussion how pay mix is measured makes difference 
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TABLE 3
Results of OLS Regression Analysis of CEO Pay Mix
Bonus Bonus Stock Options Stock Options Variable pay Variable pay
Variable Base pay Total pay Base pay Total pay Base pay Total pay
Employee (logarithm) 0.11 0.00 0.19* 0.01 0.21* 0.02*
(0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01)
ROA 0.02 -0.00 0.06** 0.01** 0.05** 0.00*
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
CEO tenure (logarithm) 0.01 0.02** -0.13 -0.01 -0.09 0.00
(0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
Owner-controlled firm -0.15 0.01 -0.29 -0.02 -0.33 -0.02
(0.19) (0.02) (0.21) (0.03) (0.21) (0.02)
Owner-managed firm -0.72 0.08 -1.47+ -0.26** -1.22 -0.12+
(0.68) (0.06) (0.78) (0.09) (0.76) (0.07)
Risk -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00* -0.01 -0.00*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Outside CEO 0.15 0.01 0.37 0.07* 0.32 0.04+
(0.21) (0.02) (0.24) (0.03) (0.23) (0.02)
Founder CEO 0.91** -0.06+ 1.66*** 0.16*** 1.31*** 0.03
(0.34) (0.03) (0.39) (0.05) (0.38) (0.03)
Intercept -0.14 0.16+ -0.22 0.19 0.17 0.41***
(0.96) (0.08) (1.10) (0.13) (1.07) (0.09)
Adjusted R-square 0.019 0.034 0.098 0.084 0.081 0.069
F-statistics 1.38 1.71* 3.16*** 2.82*** 2.77** 2.47***
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 321.
2. + < .10, * < .05, ** <  .01, *** <.001
3. Pay mix variables are in logarithm.
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DISCUSSION 
 
This study proposed to study the difference in compensation between outsider CEOs and 
insider CEOs. We investigated the difference in their compensation from three dimensions: pay 
level, pay and performance link, and pay mix. Our analyses showed (1) outsider CEOs are paid 
more than insider CEOs, (2) pay and performance link is weaker for outsider CEOs, and (3) 
compensation package for outsider CEOs emphasizes the use of stock options measured as 
the ratio of stock options to total pay. 
Concerning the difference in pay mix between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs, we 
observed the ratio of stock options to total pay was greater for outsider CEOs. Some may argue 
firms are more likely to grant options for outsider CEOs because they own their firms' stock less 
than insider CEOs, who have already been granted large options before they were promoted. 
Although not reported here, we also conducted an analysis that examined the difference in the 
absolute value of stock options grants between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. Our analysis 
shows no significant difference between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs (p = 0.64). Therefore, 
it is not that outsider CEOs were granted greater amount of stock options, but that their 
compensation was characterized by strong emphasis on stock options. 
Our analysis on pay mix offered a partial support for agency theory prediction, which 
argued pay mix for outsider CEOs would indicate stronger emphasis on incentives. We found 
the relative importance of stock options (measured as the ratio to total pay) was significantly 
greater in outsider CEOs' compensation than insider CEOs' compensation. In contrast, the 
relative importance of bonus (either bonus/salary or bonus/total pay) was not significantly 
different between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. These results may be attributed to the 
difference in CEOs' perception of risks attached to different forms of incentives. CEOs may 
perceive less risk with stock options than with bonus because (a) even if the stock price drops, 
firms may reprice the options, and (b) greater stock price volatility increases the value of stock 
options using Black-Scholes pricing model (Gerhart, 2000). Therefore, CEOs may be less 
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reluctant to accept compensation package that emphasizes stock options. They would rather 
perceive stock options are more desirable to increase their wealth especially when stock market 
is growing. Consequently, outsider CEOs, who reserve greater managerial discretion, may 
manipulate their pay package to emphasize stock options aiming to increase their wealth. In 
contrast, CEOs may be more reluctant to accept bonus because they perceive greater risk with 
it. Accordingly outsider CEOs try to influence their compensation package to de-emphasize 
bonus. Contrary, agency theory argues stockholders are inclined to use bonus for outsider 
CEOs due to insufficient information on the abilities of outsider CEOs. As a result, these two 
competing forces may have canceled out each other, and led to insignificant difference in the 
relative importance of bonus. We do not know how individuals perceive risks to different pay 
forms, and thus much of this discussion is left for future researchers. In addition, recent decline 
in stock market may have different effects on the CEOs' attitudes on stock options, which 
suggests additional analyses using the data in year 2001 or after may offer a different 
perspective. 
While it is not the primary purpose of our study, the different significance level in the 
coefficients of outsider CEOs suggests how pay mix measures influence the results we obtain. 
Our hypotheses concerning the difference in pay mix relied on agency theory and 
managerialism, which has been dominant in compensation research. Nevertheless, researchers 
have made very little attempt to discuss what pay mix measures are most consistent with these 
theory. Thus, future researchers need pay more attention to this issue. 
One potential problem of our analysis is we did not include some of potentially influential 
variables (e.g., firm strategy, human capital). Thank to the long history of CEO compensation 
research, we already have numerable variables that can influence CEO compensation. Indeed, 
adjusted R-square in our model that estimated pay level using all CEOs (first column of Table2) 
was 0.198, which was slightly less than the statistics in the recent publications (for example, 
0.25-0.26 for Sanders & Carpeters (1998)). However, our following analyses that examined 
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insider CEOs and outsider CEOs separately resulted in higher adjusted R-squares. Especially, 
adjusted-R square in the analysis of outsider CEOs (0.353) was substantially high. In addition, 
effects of control variable differ between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. Given these results, 
we believe analyzing CEO compensation with different origin separately may offer us more 
accurate view on the determinants of CEO compensation.  
Though we found outsider CEOs were paid differently from insider CEOs, our knowledge 
on the determinants of outsider CEOs' pay is still limited. Our regression analysis suggested 
firm size is the only determinant, but it doesn't necessarily mean there is no other influential 
factors. For instance, we discussed outsider CEOs have more discretion than insider CEOs 
because the formers are expected to change existing policies and corporate cultures. However, 
degree of discretion may differ even within outsider CEOs depending on how they are chosen. 
Outsider CEOs who were appointed after the dismissal of the predecessors due to 
unsatisfactory firm performance may have greater discretion than outsider CEOs chosen by the 
predecessors because they were unsatisfied with existing candidates. Therefore, further 
analysis on the determinants of outsider CEOs will increase our knowledge in CEO 
compensation. Moreover, our sample size is relatively small for outsider CEOs (N = 63), and 
thus additional tests using larger sample will be helpful to confirm our results. 
In sum, we believe that more must be learned about the relationship between origin of 
CEO and CEO compensation. Our analyses suggest compensation is different between insider 
CEOs and outsider CEOs in terms of pay level, pay and performance link, and pay mix. Among 
all, we have limited knowledge as to how compensation for new outsider CEOs are determined. 
Further development of research on the compensation for outsider CEOs is necessary.  
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